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INTRODUCTION

The problems facing New York City's contracting system have reached a· state of
crisis, no less real and no less serious than the more conspicuous problems facing the City. A 12 month review has convinced this Commission that the City's labyrinthine contracting system wastes
millions of taxpayer dollars -- dollars which otherwise could be spent fighting crime, drug abuse and
homelessness. It is mired in red tape, scares away vendors and remains vulnerable to corruption.
Contracting is the lifeblood of the City's operations. Each year, the City spends more
than $6.5 billion on contracts for a panoply of supplies, equipment, services and construction. The
City buys two-way radios, unmarked cars and bulletproof vests for police officers who patrol City
streets. It buys food to feed homeless families and finds contractors to paint and repair City-run
homeless shelters. It hires security guards to protect City buildings, contractors to repair City streets,
and construction firms to renovate City housing.
To take the measure of the City's giant contracting system, 1 the Commission has
interviewed more than 60 City employees from 25 agencies responsible for contracting on the City's
behalf. We have reviewed thousands of pages of contract documents, questioned over 70 vendors,
consulted contracting experts, studied the work of the State-City Commission on Integrity in
Government, the Institute for Public Administration and the Mayor's Private Sector Survey, and held
two days of public hearings. 2
The Commission has found that the City's contracting system is fragmented and
chaotic. The City's contracting operations are awash in a sea of paper, plagued by inordinate delays,
and clouded by unclear and inconsistent rules and procedures which slow City business to a crawl
and discourage vendors from stepping forward to bid. As a result, the City often pays far more than
it should for goods and services, wasting millions of taxpayer dollars. At the same time, the
widespread reluctance of vendors to do business with the City offers opportunities for bid-rigging and
corrupt side-deals.
Over the past several years, scattered attempts at reform have been made. Often
working in isolation from one another, well-meaning City workers have tinkered with the system,
trying here and there to fix the small piece of the contracting maze which falls within their control.
But New York City's contracting operations are too big and too complex to be reformed piecemeal.

1 In deference to the work of other groups like the New York State Organized Crime Task Force, a decision was made not
to include the City's construction operations in the Commission's study.
2 The transcript of the Commission's hearings on October 24 and 25, 1989 is cited as "Tr.• Exhibits introduced at those
hearings are referred to as "Commission Exhibit."
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Meanwhile, the key to real reform of its contracting system has been available to the
City for many years. Over the course of the past several decades, government contracting has
emerged in cities and towns across the country as a distinct body of knowledge and expertise. Faced
with common problems and common concerns, state and local governments around the nation have
developed common standards and procedures for maximizing competition, negotiating contracts and
monitoring contractor performance. 3
Unfortunately, advances in the field of government contracting have been ignored by
many New York City agencies. While other governments have streamlined their contracting
procedures, simplified their contract documents, developed professional training and certification
programs for their buyers and devised the kinds of computerized information systems which allow
them to manage their contracting operations effectively, the City has remained wedded to outmoded
and inefficient ways of doing business.
In 1986, the State-City Commission on Integrity in Government ("the Sovern
Commission") conducted an overview of the City's contracting problems. In a report foreshadowing
this Commission's work, the Sovern Commission warned that New York's failure to address the
fragmentation and complexity of its contracting operations was an open invitation to corruption. 4
"Corruption and abuses of trust," the Sovern Commission warned, "shun the bright light of day and
thrive in the confusion and opacity of procurement laws and practices that lack clarity, consistency
and uniformity."5
What the City needs, the Sovern Commission found, is a comprehensive reexamination and reorganization of the City's far-flung contracting operations. Instead of each City
agency developing its own contracting policies and its own contracting documents, the Sovern
Commission urged the creation of one central authority responsible for all aspects of the City's
contracting policies and procedures, if not for the City's .actual day-to-day purchasing decisions. New
York City needs someone to orchestrate the entire contracting system, setting procurement policies
and overseeing their implementation Citywide by individual agencies.6
Since the Sovern report was issued, a chorus of voices has sounded the same theme.
The Institute of Public Administration ("the IPA"), commissioned by Mayor Edward I. Koch to

3 Information on modem government contracting practices is available from organizations like the National Institute of
Government Purchasing, the National Association of Purchasing Management and the General Services Administration's Training
Institute. Pertinent details are included in the Appendix.
4 State-City Commission on Integrity in Government, Report and Recommendations Relating to City Procurement and
Contracts (November 19, 1986) at 67. This report is cited below as the "Sovern Commission Report."
5 Sovern Commission Report at 67.

6 Sovern Commission Report at 70, 92-93. The idea of a central authority responsible for setting procurement policy is
a long-standing one. As early as 1979, the American Bar Association's Model Procurement Code for State and Local
Governments included a recommendation for a central procurement policy body.
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examine New York City's contracting operations, called on the City in November 1987 to establish a
central procurement panel to assist in developing Citywide procurement guidelines and to propose
Citywide policies to the Mayor. 7 The IPA stressed the City's urgent need to draw on the kind of
government contracting expertise that is available to other cities and states around the country.
The IP A also took the Sovern Commission recommendations one step further,
focusing on how to implement new, uniform procurement policies. The IP A rightly foresaw that the
development of the new policies would be in vain if the City did not take steps to improve the skills
of its existing contracting personnel. The City, the IPA warned, suffers from a "serious shortage" of
staff with experience and expertise in the technical and managerial aspects of contracting. 8 The City
needs to make a sustained effort to recruit and to train contract staff and to improve their contract
negotiation, contract management and contract monitoring skills. 9
Two years have gone by since the IP A issued its recommendations. Yet, as recently
as September 1989, the Mayor's Private Sector Survey was dismayed by the lack of clear Citywide
contracting guidelines and the absence of City-wide training programs. 10
The City's failure to date to take the steps prescribed by the Sovern Commission and
the IP A is all the more perplexing given the City's current fiscal bind. The modest investment
necessary to implement these reforms will result in the saving of tens of millions of dollars each year.
Dr. Annmarie Walsh, the author of the IPA study, testified that $60 million a year was a "very
conservative" estimate of what the City could save by remedying the flaws in the City's contracting
operations. 11 On the capital budget side, the Mayor's Private Sector Survey estimated that the City
stood to save $3.8 billion over the next 10 years by streamlining the contracting process. 12 Quite
simply, the City has reached a point where it can no longer afford "business as usual."
Fortunately, the new Charter adopted by the voters on November 7, 1989 sets the
City on a new course. A new 5-member Procurement Policy Board, to be appointed by the Mayor
and the Comptroller, is charged with developing uniform, Citywide rules for soliciting bids, selecting
vendors and managing contracts. It also has the power to impose deadlines aimed at cutting back on

7 Institute of Public Administration, Contracting in New York City Government, Final Report and Recommendations
(November 1987) at 13. This report is cited below as "the IPA Report."
·

8 IPA Report at 5.
9 IPA Report at 7-9.
lO The Mayor's Private Sector Survey consists of a group of senior private sector executives loaned by their firms to the
City to help streamline the management of City operations. Their work is summarized in The New York City Service Crisis:
A Management Response (September 1989), cited below as "the Private Sector Survey." See .!9,. at 32, 36.
11 Tr. at 425-26.

12 Private Sector Survey at 3 7.
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the delay which is currently choking the City's contracting system. Simplifying and standardizing the
contract language which now confuses and discourages potential vendors is also on the Procurement
Policy Board's agenda.
Sweeping though the changes called for by the Charter are, they are not selfexecuting. Implementing the Charter changes will require the time and careful attention of both the
new Mayor and the new Comptroller, as well as persistent oversight by the City Council. At the
same time, the Charter alone cannot restore vitality to the City's contracting operations. Additional
measures are needed if the promise of reform held out by the Charter is to be realized.

II.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

As more fully discussed below, the Commission urges the City's new leaders to take
the following steps to bolster the new Charter changes:
1. The new Mayor and the new Comptroller should undertake a
nationwide search for the most knowledgeable and experienced
procurement experts to serve as the five members of the Procurement
Policy Board. The taxpayers of this City deserve the advice of a topflight Board composed only of those with a national reputation in the
field of procurement. Similar care should be given to the selection of
the Board's staff.
2. To oversee the Citywide implementation of the new contracting
procedures, the City needs a deputy mayor for whom the reform of
the City's contracting operations would be his or her sole responsibility
for a transition period of at least two years. He or she must have a
clear, unambiguous mandate to address contracting problems Citywide.
3. Each City agency must be required, as the IPA recommended two
years ago, to appoint at a senior management level a chief contracting
officer with professional procurement background. The reforms to be
proposed by the Procurement Policy Board will come to naught if the
expertise is lacking at the agency level -- where the actual purchases
are made -- to implement those reforms.
4. Similarly, the new Mayor must heed the IPA's warning that the
City suffers from a desperate shortage of experienced contracting staff
and must take steps to train the hundreds of employees who spend
billions of taxpayers' dollars on contracts each year. Too much
money is at stake to entrust this responsibility to purchasing staff who
4

lack the skills and the tools necessary to get the best possible deal for
the City.
5. Instead of trying to police each contract before it is awarded, the
City needs to develop a system for reviewing contract decisions after
the fact, on a selective post-audit basis, to make sure that contracts
are awarded in accordance with the City's rules and procedures and
that the City gets the best value for its dollars.
The time has come for a comprehensive re-examination and reorganization of New
York City's entire contracting operations in the light of the government contracting expertise available
to other cities and states around the country. As witness after witness testified at our Commission's
hearings in October 1989, the overhaul of the City's contracting system "is not a big deal." 13 All that
is required is "a captain at the head of the ship" with a vision and the political will to say "this is our
objective, this is our timetable, let's go to it." 14

ill.

THE CITY'S CONTRACTING OPERATIONS ARE A CRAZY QUILT
OF INCONSISTENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Contracting is big business in New York City. In fiscal year 1989 alone, the City's
contracting expenditures accounted for approximately 25 percent of the City's entire budget. Yet, to
date, no one person has been ultimately responsible for, and thus no one person has been ultimately
accountable for, the way in which the City spends that money. The Board of Estimate, which has
historically played a key role in the City contracting process, has contributed to the lack of
accountability. As Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., chairman of the Charter Revision Commission,
testified in October: l5

In tenns of integrity, one of the problems [the Board of
Estimate] leaves for the City is, if something does go
wrong, nobody can be held responsible because each [of the
Board members] can say, "Well, I don't know, we all di.cl
it," and then they point to each other. Specifically, it lets
the Mayor off the hook, and I think that is a severe fa ult
from an integrity point of view . . . .

13 Tr. at 57. See also Tr. at 107, 241-42.
14 Tr. at 57.
15 Tr. at 462-63.
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ResJX>nsibility for the City's purchasing operations varies depending on what is
purchased, how the contract is awarded, and the dollar amount spent. The lion's share of the City's
supplies and equipment is purchased centrally by the Department of General Services' Division of
Municipal Supplies, although small purchases under $5,000 may be made by individual agencies. In
contrast, the purchase of services (such as security guard services, car services, repair services and the
like) is decentralized, with each of the City's agencies resJX>nsible for its own purchases, regardless of
dollar amount. Contracts over $10,000 awarded by methods other than sealed bidding (such as sole
source contracts and contracts awarded based on requests for proposals 16), on the other hand, have
required the approval of the Board of Estimate before individual City agencies can finalize the award.
Over the years, the City has developed a crazy quilt of contracting practices and
procedures which vary from agency to agency or even bureau to bureau, a source of confusion and
frustration to vendors trying to do business with the City. Because there are few channels for
contracting personnel in one agency or bureau to communicate with their peers in other agencies and
other bureaus and to discuss common problems and common solutions, City contracting personnel
often reinvent the wheel to solve common contracting problems, wasting time and, even worse,
wasting money.
In late December 1987, in resJX>nse to the IPA's recommendations, Mayor Koch
announced the apJX>intment of the first director of the Mayor's Office of Contracts. Many observers
hoped that that office would serve as the energetic "mastermind" for the City's contracting, carefully
reviewing and evaluating all aspects of the City's contracting operations with an eye toward
simplifying and coordinating each of those aspects. In practice, the Office of Contracts has turned
out to be an "Office of Some Contracts," 17 with a primary focus on the $1.3 billion the City spends
on sole source and RFP contracts. 18
From the outset, the Office of Contracts lacked a mandate for a comprehensive
approach to the City's contracting problems. Executive Order 114, which formally established the
Mayor's Office of Contracts, was narrower in scope than the IP A re}X)rt which it purJX>rted to
implement. 19 Missing from the list of the Office of Contracts' resJX>nsibilities is any reference to the
need to solve what was, to the IPA's mind, perhaps the single greatest obstacle to improved City

16 In the case of a request for proposals ("RFP"), the selection of a vendor is not based solely on price. Rather, the
vendor's background, experience and approach to the problem posed in the RFP are also considered. Tr. at 274-76.
l7 Tr. at 411.
18 At the Commission's October 1989 hearing, Joel Copperman, Director of the Mayor's Office of Contracts, explained that

he focused first on RFP contracts because he understood that to be the focus of the IPA repon. Tr. at 318. Accordingly, the
first - - and, to date, only - - set of uniform contracting guidelines issued by his office deal with procedures for preparing RFPs
and awarding an RFP contract. See Mayor's Office of Contracts, Guidelines For Mayoral Agency Contracting (September
1989) .
19 See Executive Order No. 114 (April 13, 1988) . See also Office of the Mayor, Press Release 426-87 (December 8, 1987)

and Commission Exhibit 18.
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contracting -- the lack of systematic training programs for City contracting personnel. 20 Nor does
Executive Order 114 mention the need to standardize and simplify City contract language, another
key IP A recommendation.
Meanwhile, huge chunks of the City's contracting operations have fallen outside the
purview of the Office of Contracts. The Department of General Services' Division of Municipal
Supplies ("OMS"), for instance, enters into approximately $550 million worth of contracts each year
for equipment and supplies. Although both the State Comptroller and the New York City Auditor
General have warned that OMS' operations need closer scrutiny, 21 OMS' performance has not been
examined by the Office of Contracts.22
Similarly, the City spends hundreds of millions of dollars each year on competitively
bid services -- which run the gamut from car services for children to roof repair services and
management of City parking garages. Each agency purchases services on its own, subject to its own
rules and its own procedures. For the most part, these contracting activities have taken place outside
the purview of the Office of Contracts. The Office of Contracts has yet to complete uniform
guidelines to govern the award of these contracts and has yet to specify what background and
experience City buyers of these services must have.
Even in areas to which the Office of Contracts has turned its attention, it has often
concentrated on isolated pieces of the problem and has not developed a comprehensive approach.
For instance, the Office of Contracts has led the Voluntary/City Taskforce on Human Services
Contracts, aimed at improving the City's contracting relationship with not-for-profit firms providing
human services to the City. 23 But it has not yet dealt in any systematic way with the difficulties
faced by hundreds of ordinary, commercial businesses struggling to find their way through the
labyrinth of the City's contract documents and procedures. It has not studied the effect of the City's
insurance and bid security requirements2 4 on competition for City business and has not urged the

20 IPA Repon at 10.
21 Office of the New York State Comptroller, Office of the State Deputy Comptroller for New York City, New York Cicy
Depanment of General Services, Division of Municipal Supplies: Procurement Procedures and Practices, Reoon A-24-87 (July
27, 1988); Auditor General's Reoon to the Mayor on Prompt Payment (October 23, .1987) at 11-12 ("a comprehensive review
of DOS (DMS') procurement function must be undenaken to investigate some of the troubling contentions made to us by
numerous agency personnel").
22 Tr. at 272.
23 See Commission Exhibit 31 at 5 and Tr. at 348.
24 Several wimes.ses at the Commission's October 1989 hearing testified that the City's insurance requirements are excessive

and out of line with insurance requirements of other jurisdictions. One wimess told of being asked to supply $1 million wonh
of liability insurance for a three-day training session in contracting procedures. Tr. at 219-20. Another testified that HRA had
to reject the low bidder on a car service contract because it was unable to meet the agency's $5 million insurance requirement.
Tr. at 127 -30. Similarly, wimes.ses interviewed by the Commission expressed the view that the City's bid security requirements
effectively shut many small firms out of the bidding process.
(continued ...)
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Department of Personnel to design career paths for City contracting staff based on reasonable
professional training and certification requirements.
The Office of Contracts has devoted substantial resources to the design and
development of a computer system -- known as VENDEX25 -- to capture information on the
background of contractors seeking to do business with the City.26 Little planning seems to have been
done to answer the question frequently posed by agency contracting personnel: "What will we do with
this information?" No guidelines have been prepared to govern the agencies' use of this data.27
In short, the fragmentation to which the City's contracting operations as a whole are
prone is mirrored in the Office of Contracts. Unless the City's new leaders seize the initiative and
forcefully insist on a comprehensive approach to contracting reform, their efforts will be frustrated.

IV.

1HE CITY'S CONTRACTING SYSTEM DETERS COMPETITION
AND WASTES TAXPAYERS' DOLLARS

A.

The City Has Trouble Attracting A Reasonable Degree Of Competition
For A Wide Range Of Services

The problems of the City's contracting system have been compounded by the City's
reaction to the municipal corruption scandals which began to unfold in late 1985 and early 1986. As
a result, the contracting process has been saddled with an ever increasing burden of paperwork
requiring review and approval by many different oversight agencies.

24 (...continued)
Recognizing that these issues are complex, the Commission does not take a position on them, but urges the City to
include them in a comprehensive review of the City's contracting process.
25 VENDEX is designed to insure that the City does not do business with companies who have criminal records, a history
of poor performance or are in arrears on City taxes. The focus is on excluding "bad" vendors. But an even more pressing
problem facing the City, as set fonh below, is the need to ~ more vendors. If there were a greater degree of competition
for City business, the City would be less likely to find itself faced with the Hobson's choice of contracting with a "bad" vendor.
26 Firms bidding on City contracts over a cenain dollar threshold must fill out a 26-page VENDEX Business Entity
Questionnaire calling, among other things, for detailed information on who they share office space with, whether anyone in a
management capacity has ever worked for the City, and what their past contracting history with the City and other government
entities has been. See Commission Exhibit 12.

Information from these questionnaires (together with information culled from evaluations of a vendor's performance on
past City contracts, lists of vendors who have been debarred from City business or against whom other administrative action has
been taken, and data from contract information systems at DMS and the Mayor's Office of Construction) is scheduled to be
stored in a computer to which City contracting personnel will have access. Tr. at 285-86. Currently, a printed version of some
of this information - - known as the VENDEX Caution List - - is periodically circulated to the agencies.

27 Tr. at 338-39.
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To he sure, each added layer of oversight originates in a well-intentioned response to
a particular scandal or crisis. Together, however, they add up to a blueprint for paralysis. Instead of
a clear vision of what constitutes good contracting practice, the City has pieced together a patchwork
of checkpoints and barriers. Their cumulative effect is to slow the City's business to a crawl and to
deter vendors from bidding on City business.
It is difficult to measure precisely the impact this "nightmare of red tape" 28 has on
competition for City business. Depending on the circumstances, experts consider five bids or three
bids the bare minimum necessary for adequate competition.29 But the City as a whole keeps no
records on the extent of competition for City contracts. A brand new computerized contract
reporting system jointly developed by the City Comptroller and the Mayor's Office of Management
and Budget is incapable of generating statistical information on the degree of competition for City
business and could not provide us with information on the number of City contracts awarded on the
basis of fewer than three bids.30

1. Multi-Million Dollar Contracts Go Begging
For Bidders At HRA
Because the City lacks uniform rules governing the computerization of each agency's
contract records, the availability of key contracting information -- and the ability to evaluate an
agency's contracting performance -- varies from agency to agency. The Commission asked four City
agencies (Corrections, Transportation, Human Resources Administration and the Department of
General Services' Division of Municipal Supplies) whether they maintained a computerized database of
contract information. Only the Human Resources Administration ("HRA") kept the kinds of
computerized records from which information on the degree of competition for sealed bid contracts
could he readily extracted.

28 Tr. at 107.

29 Tr. at 228.
JO The Integrated Comprehensive Contract Information System ("ICCIS"), the City's new contract reporting system, is only
capable of distinguishing between contracts for which a single bid was received and contracts for which more than a single bid
was received. Because ICCIS cannot differentiate contracts awarded on the basis of two bids from contracts awarded on the
basis of ten bids, ICCIS cannot provide a breakdown of City contracts based on the number of bids received.

ICCIS was developed in response to a local law passed by City Council in 1987, which mandated the creation of a
computerized contract information system for the City. See Local Law 57 (1987); Commission Exhibit 26. Those charged with
implementing that law candidly acknowledged that they did not attempt co find out what sorts of data other jurisdictions found
useful to include in their computerized contract tracking systems. Tr. at 358-59. As a result, ICCIS is capable of generating
less information than New York State's contract ttacking system, which can readily supply statistics on the degree of competition
for various categories of state business.
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The Commission examined data on 798 competitively bid service contracts awarded
by HRA at a cost of $67,804,025 in fiscal year 1989.31 Of these, 389 contracts totalling $51,015,294
were awarded on the basis of fewer than three bids. In other words, 49 percent of HRA's
competitively bid service contracts -- accounting for 75 percent of $67 million in spending -- were
awarded with fewer than a bare minimum of three bids.
HRA was unable to attract more than two bids for a wide range of services. For
instance, only two vendors stepped forward to bid on a $5.2 million contract to provide cooked meals
for the homeless in City shelters, although 30 companies had been invited to bid. Only one vendor
out of 41 was interested in an $850,000 contract to provide frozen meals to homeless shelters. 32
In July 1988, HRA invited 535 car service companies to bid on four contracts to
drive children in Manhattan, Queens and the Bronx to and from foster homes, hospitals and court
appointments. HRA received just one bid per contract, each from the same vendor, Big Apple Car
Services. Its bids ranged from $422,910 on the smallest contract to $3,191,666 on the largest. 33
Altogether, from March 1988 through July 1988, Big Apple Car Services was awarded nearly $9
million in car service contracts for which it was the sole bidder.34
The same pattern emerged when HRA sought bidders to install and maintain burglar
alarms throughout the City. In April 1988, HRA invited 30 vendors to bid on eight separate
contracts to install and service burglar alarms. Each contract attracted just one bid. All eight
contracts, totaling over $2.1 million, were awarded to the only firm that bid. 35

2. Other City Agencies Have Experienced Difficulty
Attracting Vendors
Other agencies, unlike HRA, could not generate statistics for the Commission on the
degree of competition for contracts they awarded. The Department of General Services' Division of
Municipal Supplies, for instance, buys the bulk of the City's equipment and supplies, and awards
contracts worth over half a billion dollars annually. OMS, however, was unable to produce any
statistics on the degree of competition for OMS contracts, since its bid tabulation process was not

31 The Commission was advised that these 798 contracts comprise virtually the entire universe of competitively bid service
contracts awarded by HRA's Office of Purchasing and Materials Management in FY89. They include, for instance, contracts
for guard services, exterminating, painting, food services, transponation, asbestos removal, plumbing and roof repair. They do
not include human services program contracts for day care, foster care and the like.
32 Human Resources Administration, Temporary ID nos. 9-0010 and 9-0082.
33 See Commission Exhibit 6, p.2.
34 !Q.

35 !Q., p.l.
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automated until May 1989 and its computer, as of October 1989, had not yet been programmed to
generate such statistics. 36
When the Commission asked the Department of Transportation to furnish a list of its
contracts awarded upon the basis of fewer than three bids, the Commission was told that only one
bureau -- the Bureau of Highway Operations -- kept the kind of computerized records that could
generate that information. This lone contract bid data base was created by an employee who brought
in his own computer from home to get the job done. He had never been asked to set up a similar
data base for any of DOT's other bureaus or divisions (let alone any other City agency) and, indeed,
it did not appear that anyone outside his immediate unit was even aware of what he is capable of
doing, let alone how they could benefit from it.
Other agencies lacked any effective computerized contract bid data base. The
Department of Correction, for instance, generated a list of contracts awarded on the basis of fewer
than three bids but advised the Commission that the information had to be gathered manually, since
none of the data was available on any computer system.
Despite a lack of precise computerized data, there is ample evidence that competition
is scant for millions of dollars worth of City business. As Dr. Annmarie Walsh, the author of the
IP A study, testified at the Commission's recent contracting hearings, "there is no decent competition
for a very large part of the City's purchases."37 All too often, the City is faced with a small number
of "niche" bidders, firms whose expertise lies in threading their way through the City contracting maze
and who have adapted themselves to its peculiar and confounding logic.
A few examples illustrate the magnitude of the problem, which is not limited to any
one agency or any one type of commodity or service:

••

When the Department of Correction sought to replace
the repair company responsible for maintaining the
elevators in City prisons, it split the contract job into
five separate components and put each one out to bid
separately. Only one company stepped forward to bid
-- the very same company the City was seeking to replace.38

36 DMS did maintain a handwritten log, later computerized, of contract solicitations in response to which a single bid had
been received, reflecting bids which had been referred to the Comptroller's office for a •second look" before awarding the
contract.
37 Tr. at 454-55.

38 Deparonent of Correction contracts 2CBP88 (8001479), 13CBP88 (8001481), 14CBP88 (8001508), 15CBP88 (8001480)
and 16CBP88 (8001482) .
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•
• •

Between October 1987 and June 1988, the
Departments of Sanitation and Transportation awarded
five security guard contracts worth $6.8 million to a
single furn, the only one to have submitted a bid. 39

• •

Fewer than three vendors have bid on the Division of
Municipal Supplies' contracts for basic food items such
as macaroni, spaghetti and egg noodles, infant formula,
frozen pizza and tuna salad. 40

••

In April 1987, the Department of Transportation
awarded a $980,000 contract to manage a City
parking facility near City Hall to the only company to
bid in response to a public advertisement. Over the
preceding three years, that same firm and its parent
company were awarded an additional $3.9 million
worth of contracts to manage City parking facilities.
In each instance, they were the only one to submit a
bid.41

3. Vendors Describe Doing Business With New York City
As Unusually Time-Consuming, Expensive And Exasperating

To learn what deters companies from bidding on City business, Commission staff
interviewed more than 70 vendors, representing companies ranging in size from "mom and pop"
operations to firms with national reputations and national clienteles, who had recently declined
invitations to bid on City contracts. Uniform throughout the interviews was the theme that doing
business with New York City is a time-consuming, expensive and often exasperating experience.
By far, the top vendor complaint is late payment. Notwithstanding the City's publicly
announced commitment to prompt payment, the City retains its reputation among the business
community as a very, very slow payer.42 The problem is of such proportion that many vendors make
a City agency's payment track record a major consideration in their bidding. If their past experience
with an agency has been to wait for six months before a check arrives -- or if that is the agency's

39 Department of Sanitation contracts 08900491, 08900492, 08900592 and Department of Transportation contracts
08900882, 08900152.
4-0 Division of Municipal Supplies bid numbers 9800, 11281, 13480, 14154, 14360, and 14891.
4l Department of Transportation contracts 0890l(i()9, 08900417, 08900192, 08900138, 08901000, G80Ml952.

42 The director of the Mayor's Office of Contracts testified that he has received "numerous complaints" from vendors who
have not been paid. Tr. at 350.
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reputation -- they will not bid. The payment ~ue scares away potential bidders and creates crippling
cash flow problems. While many larger companies may be able to wait out the delay, smaller
companies are left struggling to meet a payroll.
Vendors trying to chase down payments tell of being bounced from division to
division, dealing with City employee after City employee who cannot find their invoices. One witness
testified that it took her almost 40 calls to locate the right person to call about a late payment.'13
Once the vendor's invoice is submitted, then the waiting starts. One painting
contractor took out a $50,000 loan to meet his payroll until the outstanding City check arrived. 44
Another painting contractor has worked out an arrangement with another company to "buy" his
finished jobs which the City had not yet paid for. He does the work and then "sells" the contract at
a discount. That way, the vendor gets paid on the spot and another company collects from the City.
Without this arrangement, the vendor said that he would have to tum down City work since he does
not have the cash to bridge the payment gap.45
The perception that payment will be late in corning is often factored into a vendor's
bid price. For instance, in June 1988, one vendor agreed to give HRA a four percent discount, in
exchange for HRA's promise to pay within 30 business days. 46
Vendors also complained about the sheer volume of City paperwork, which adds to
their overhead and which, for a small company, can be forbidding. One witness described picking up
an 8" -thick stack of contract documents from the Department of General Services and tying them up
with a rope to cart them back to his office.47
Compounding the problem of the volume of the City's paperwork is the lack of
standardized contract language. Since each City agency writes its own contracts, several different
agencies trying to purchase an identical service may use several different sets of terms and conditions.
Vendors complain that this means that there are no clear rules for dealing with the City. As a result,
they and their lawyers must wade throughout several different sets of fine print to make sure that

43 Tr. at

84. Her experience at HRA, which was "the worst ordeal [she] went through at any agency," contrasted sharply
with her experience at the Departtnent of General Services, where "at least you know ·an assigned person in each departtnent
that's going to be responsible for something. They call you bade and treat you like you're human." Tr. at 86.
44 Tr. at 125-26.
45 HRA's Executive Deputy Administrator took issue with vendors' complaints about late payment and testified that "HRA
now pays 90 percent of all its purchases within 30 days of receiving the invoice." Tr. at 182. At the same time, he
acknowledged that his agency had done nothing to disseminate that information to potential bidders. !Q.
46 See Commission Exhibit 14. Similarly, the Mayor's Private Sector Survey found that many construction firms "feel
constrained to cover their extraordinary risks with often substantial contingency factors." Private Sector Survey at 36.

47 Tr. at 94-95.
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there is no hidden term or condition which will come back to haunt them after the contract has been
signed. As one vendor graphically described the situation: 48

Every agency is different. My biggest problem with the
City agencies is that every one of them requires a different
piece of paper. You would think that you were dealing
with Gimbel's and Macy's and Stems.
Most City contracts are difficult for vendors to decipher without the help of a lawyer.
Many small vendors cannot afford to seek legal advice for every contract they are considering bidding
on. Rather than spend the money it would take to retain a lawyer to review the City's bid
documents, they simply decide to pass up the opportunity to bid. Vendors who routinely do business
with other jurisdictions cannot understand why the contracting process is so much more complex and
cumbersome in the City.49
B.

The Lack of Competition Leaves City Taxpayers Vulnerable
To Higher Prices

The shrinking pool of vendors willing to do business with New Yark City is a clear
warning signal which the City ignores at its peril. The lack of competition leaves the City vulnerable
to higher prices, wasting tax dollars that could be used to hire more police officers or teachers, repair
more bridges or house more homeless.
For instance, before a contract is put out for bid, HRA commonly prepares a rough
estimate of what the contract should cost. The Commission found that the price of contracts where
competition was limited to fewer than three bids was more likely to exceed the City's cost estimate
than contracts where there was a reasonable degree of competition. For example, among the 798
sealed bid service contracts HRA awarded in fiscal year 1989, the City paid more than its estimated
contract price 29 percent of the time when HRA received fewer than three bids. In contrast, only 13
percent of the contracts cost more than the City's estimate when HRA received three or more bids.
For contracts over $10,000, the cost to the taxpayer of a lack of competition was
even more striking. HRA paid more than its estimated contract price 46 percent of the time when it
received fewer than three bids, as opposed to 22 percent of the time when it received three or more
bids. As a former Deputy Commissioner of the Department of General Services testified, "when you
have only got one competitor, it's easier to know that competitor's pricing structure. What you'll
gradually see is a moving up of prices."50

4S Tr. at 83.

49 Tr. at 95-96, 107-08, 135, 151 -52, 224.
50 Tr. at 259.
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Interviews conducted by Commission staff confirmed this statistical picture. Technical
staff at HRA estimated that elevator maintenance work costs the City three to four times as much as
such work costs the private sector. 51 Installers of burglar and fire alarms told Commission staff that
"City work goes for a premium because of the bureaucracy and red tape. "52 Likewise, a roofing
contractor acknowledged that his bid prices on City work were inflated by two to ten percent to take
into account the "aggravation and late payment. "53
Vendors are often acutely aware of the degree to which they face competition and
may structure their bids to reflect the presence or absence of competition. Contracting staff at the
Department of Housing, Preservation and Development told the Commission that the winning bidder
on a contract to supply handymen to City-owned housing attended a bid opening, bringing with him
two bid envelopes, one containing a high bid and one containing a low bid. Spotting the
representative of a major competitor in the bid room, the bidder put in his low bid envelope. When
the bids were opened, he was dismayed to learn he could have bid the higher amount, since his major
competitor put in a "no bid. "5"
A security guard contract awarded by HRA provides a dramatic case study of the
hidden costs borne by taxpayers when the contract process is poorly managed. In December 1987,
HRA solicited bids for a two-year contract to provide unarmed security guards to government offices
throughout the City. Six companies submitted bids. The low bidder was Ogden Allied Services, a
Fortune 200 company which regularly contracts with the federal government and with states and
municipalities across the country. Ogden's winning bid of $7.97 per hour per guard came to a total
bid price of $6.5 million over the life of the contract.55
Ogden's experience with this contract was fraught with delay and confusion. Ogden
had agreed with the City that it would be ready to start work on Monday, January 18, 1988. Ogden
went out, recruited security guards, and set up training classes for them. Suddenly, late on the
afternoon of Friday, January 15, 1988 -- just before Ogden was to start work -- Ogden received an
unexpected phone call from HRA, advising the company that the start date had to be postponed for
several weeks. The entire class of security guards, whom Ogden had recruited and trained at a cost

5 l Tr. at 146. Similarly, the Department of Transportation received a single bid on an elevator maintenance contract which
was three times the agency's cost estimate for the job. OOT's staff decided that the bid price was unacceptably high and put
the contract out for bid again. Again, there was only one bidder, the same one as before. This time, the bid price exceeded
the agency's cost estimate by 70 percent. Tr. at 139-40.

52 Tr. at 135-36.
53 Tr. at 135.
54 Tr. at 147-48.

55 See Commission Exhibit 5.
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-of $50,000, had to be replaced and retrained, since Ogden could not keep its security staff idle for an
indefinite period without pay. 56
Ogden's contract with the City originally estimated that Ogden would be as.signed
approximately 280,000 hours of security guard work over the course of the first six months of the
two-year contract. 57 In practice, that figure was slashed in half. When Ogden finally started work on
February 11, 1988, its guards were as.signed fewer than half the hours anticipated in the contract
documents on which Ogden had premised its bid. 58 As the weeks went by, and Ogden lost more and
more money, the situation became untenable. In the early spring of 1988, Ogden reached an
agreement with HRA allowing the company to walk away from the job, 18 months before its two-year
contract was due to expire. 59
The City's delay in starting the contract and the inability of HRA's staff to predict
with accuracy the number of hours to be as.signed to the winning bidder cost taxpayers over a million
dollars. When HRA sought to replace Ogden in May 1988, only two companies submitted bids,
down from six bidders in December 1987. The low bidder, Professional Security, bid $11.38 an hour
per guard, $3.39 more per hour than Ogden had bid in December and $2.39 more than Professional
Security's own prior bid just five months before.60 Overall, from June 1988 through September 1989,
the City paid $1.2 million more to Professional Security than it would have paid Ogden under the
terms of Ogden's two-year contract with the City.
Ogden experienced similar delays on other contracts. 61 As a result, this Fortune 200
firm has withdrawn from competition for New York City business altogether. Ogden's vice-president
for municipal services testified at the Commission's October hearings that his firm had no plans to bid
on future New York City contracts,62 although his firm continues to do business with state and
federal government agencies in the New York City area.

56 Tr. at 17-19.
57 See Commmission Exhibit SA and Tr. at 20-21.

58 Tr. at 21.
59 Tr. at 23, 26.

60 See Commission Exhibit S.
61 Although Ogden was the winning bidder on a contract to install venetian blinds, it took the City ten months to issue
a stan work order. See Commission Exhibit SB and Tr. at 33.
62 Tr. at 3S-36.
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V. TIIE CITY'S CON1RACTING SYSTEM IS CRIPPLED BY DELAY

The levels of review and approval -- from the Board of Estimate on down -- which
overlay the City's contracting operations cause normal contracting activities in the City to take far
longer than would be acceptable anywhere else. The Mayor's Private Sector Survey was dismayed to
learn that:

Equipment procurement processes frequently drag on for
years, often double or triple the time taken by commercial
organizations. For example, the recent purchase of 12
personal computers by one department (a $75,000
expenditure) rook 30 months at a processing cost of
$65,000 in management and clerical time. 63
The Private Sector Survey was equally disturbed to find that the purchase of supplies costing between
$10,000 and $50,000 takes as long as two and a half months; purchases over $50,000 take an
average of five months, "months longer than in the private sector."64
An ordinary consultant contract is now subject to ten separate layers of review and
approval, not counting either the layers of internal review within the agency awarding the contract or
the Board of Estimate.65 First, the solicitation documents, and/or additional related forms and
paperwork, are reviewed by the Mayor's Office of Operations, the Mayor's Office of Management and
Budget, and the Mayor's Office of Contracts before the contract is publicly advertised or disseminated.
Then, when a vendor has been selected, the contract is reviewed again by the Mayor's Office of
Operations, the Mayor's Office of Management and Budget, and the Mayor's Office of Contracts.
In addition, the contract must be approved as to form by the Corporation Counsel.
For contracts over $50,000, detailed information on the breakdown of the vendor's workforce by sex,
race and national origin must be submitted to the Bureau of Labor Services for review; and the

63 Private Sector Survey at 77. See also Commission Exhibit 20 at 77.

64 !Q. at 99. DMS representatives informed the Commission that as of October 1989, their procurement cycle was, on
average, 65 days long. However, that figure included purchases under $ 10,000 which are made in accordance with a simplified,
streamlined procedure involving far fewer levels of review and approval and therefore much Jess time-consuming than the
procedures for purchases over $10,000. Tr. at 223.

As of October 1989, OMS was incapable of generating statistics on the length of its procurement cycle for contracts
between $10,000 and $50,000 and contracts over $50,000, although DMS was hopeful that its computer would be programmed
to do so in the near future.
65 See Mayor's Office of Contracts, Guidelines for Mayoral Agency Contracting, Appendix C ("Oversight Review and
Approval Requirements"), section CI and Commission Exhibit 19.
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vendor's name, applicable holding companies and principals must be checked by the Department of
Investigation to determine whether they have been or are about to be investigated by the City.66
Finally, the contract must be registered by the City Comptroller. There, the Office of
Contract Administration reviews the final contract documents, as well as a cover sheet needed to
instruct the City's computer to set aside the funds to pay for the contract. The paperwork is then
shipped to the Financial Information Services Agency ("FISA") where the actual encumbrance of City
funds for the contract occurs. Statistics compiled by DMS, the Department of Transportation and
the Comptroller's Office indicate that the registration process alone may add three to four weeks to
the contract award process.67
Throughout the City, contracting personnel interviewed by the Commission voiced
their frustration at their inability to get their jobs done more expeditiously. They told the
Commission that, if all goes well, it takes a minimum of four to six months to award a consultant
contract requiring approval by the Board of Estimate. It takes a minimum of three or four months to
award an ordinary service contract for work and labor, which does not require Board of Estimate
approval.
Many of these contracting employees were at their wits' end. They realize that the
sluggishness of the City's contracting operations impairs vital City programs. They realize too that
vendors are overwhelmed by the delay which afflicts every aspect of the contracting process, from
contract approval to payment. Yet there is little that any one employee, alone and isolated, can do
about the problem.
So crippling are the delays inherent in the City's contracting process that the need to
proceed with dispatch leads the City, on occasion, to take shortcuts. For example, in October 1988,
the Board of Estimate approved the award of a $6.3 million consultant contract to a naval
architecture firm, John J. McMullen Associates, Inc., to. oversee the construction of an 800-bed
floating prison for the City. How McMullen was selected illustrates the dilemma which the City's
antiquated contracting system routinely poses for City employees: do you break the rules in order to
get the job done quickly? Or do you follow the rules and risk taking months to implement vital City
programs? In the case of the jail barge, the City opted for the first alternative.

According to the findings of the New Yark City Department of Investigation ("DOI"),
this multi-million contract was never publicly advertised. George G. Sharp, Inc., a naval architecture
firm with experience in converting ferries into floating prisons for the City, was not even invited to
bid on the job. Of the three naval architecture firms the City contacted by telephone, only one

66 Review by Corporation Counsel is required for City contracts over $10,000. Tr. at 268, 273. Submission of the BLS
forms is required for contracts over $50,000. Tr. at 268-69. The OOI name check is required for consultant contracts over
$10,000 and for competitive sealed bid contracts over $100,000. Tr. at 269, 334-36.

67 See Commission Exhibit 16. In April 1990, the City is planning to set up a pilot project at HRA aimed at accelerating
the registration process. Tr. at 375-76.
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firm -- McMullen -- was invited to meet privately with City officials to discuss the contract.68 The
two other naval architecture firms received brief telephone calls, which gave them no inkling of the
magnitude of the contract. 69
Once the $6.3 million contract was negotiated with McMullen, City officials cut
comers and skirted normal contract review and approval channels. Ordinarily, consultant contracts
of this nature are reviewed by the Mayor's Office of Contracts before submission to the Board of
Esrimate. Here, the Office of Contracts was simply bypassed. The director of the Office of Contracts
did not even hear about the contract until it was a fait accompli and had been reported in the
newspapers. 70
Finally, as determined by DOI, senior City officials, on three separate occasions,
provided misleading information to the members of the Board of Estimate who voted to approve the
contract. In DOI's words, "the process used to select [McMullen] was misrepresented to the Board of
Esrimate in the resolution submitted in support of the contract; during testimony given before the
Board on October 20, 1988; and in response to inquiries made by Board of Estimate members
following the publication of the Daily News article [in December 1988]."7 1
In hindsight, City officials explain the comer-cutting which lies at the heart of the
McMullen contract -- the failure to publicly advertise the contract or even to disseminate information
about the contract evenhandedly, the failure to dear the contract through the Mayor's Office of
Contracts -- as necessary to get an important job done as quickly as possible. 72 The need for such
comer-cutting is striking evidence of the ineffectiveness of the City's existing contracting system.

68 New York City Depamnent of Investigation, Memorandum from Allan Morofsky and Thomas F. Brennan, Award of
Contract to John J. McMullen Associates, Inc. by the Depamnent of Correction (Case #0117/890), April 12, 1989 ("the 001
jail Barge Repon") at 12.
69 !Q. at 12,

14. Only one of these two firms received a shon follow-up letter which also failed to fully describe the
magnitude of the prospective contract.
70 Tr. at 342-43.
7l 001 Jail Barge Repon at 8-9. See also .!Q,. at 23 ("to the extent the resolution indicates that personal interviews with
the finalists preceded the selection of [McMullen], the resolution was drafted with a disregard for accuracy"); 24 ("the evidence
substantiates that the selection process used to select [McMullen] was misrepresented to the Board of Estimate in the language
of the resolution and in the testimony ..."); 25 ("this investigation has substantiated that the information given to the Board
with respect to ... two [related] contracts [awarded to McMullen] was inaccurate and misleading").

72 001 Jail Barge Repon at 37, Tr. at 344. The Mayor's Office of Contracts has subsequently included in its guidelines
for RFP contracts a one page set of rules for "Expedited RFPs", designed to ensure a minimum degree of competition even where,
as in the McMullen case, the RFP process is accelerated. See Guidelines for Mayoral Agency Contracting, Pan VI, Chapter
1, p.1.
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VI.

TiiE CITY'S CONTRACTING SYSTEM IS VULNERABLE
TO CORRUPT INFLUENCE

The refusal of respected and qualified companies to do business with New York City
is a warning the City cannot afford to ignore. Prosecutors have long recognized that where municipal
contracts are let to a narrow group of firms, opportunities for corruption abound. Indeed, a
questionnaire developed by the U.S. Department of Justice to assist citizens in assessing "whether
official corruption or an atmosphere that is conducive to official corruption might exist in their state
or city government" asks as its first two questions: 73

1. Do respected and well-qualified companies refuse to do
business with the city or state?

2. Are municipal contracts let to a narrow group of firms?
Witnesses at the Commission's October 1989 hearings warned that competition is
essential not only to keep prices down but to "keep the system honest": 74

[T]he less competition, I think, the more room there is for
corruption. Where you have a lot of people vying for a
particular piece of business, they'll pretty much keep each
other honest. When you have very limited competitors,
then I think you have more of an opportunity, if you will,
to decide how to split up that business.
An absence of competition not only leaves the City vulnerable to bid-rigging and ,
other forms of collusive behavior on the part of vendors, but sets the stage for collusion between City
contracting personnel and vendors.75
The difficulty vendors have in finding their way through the bewildering maze of the
City's contracting procedures is in itself a potential corruption hazard. The Sovern Commission
cautioned the City three years ago that "corruption and abuses of trust shun the bright light of day
and thrive in the confusion and opacity of procurement laws and practices that lack clarity,
consistency and uniformity." 76 As the Sovern Commission warned, "when rules are obscure, confused
or unavailable, they can be manipulated for corrupt ends. Clear and accessible rules not only make it
13 See U.S. Deparnnent of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Maintaining Municipal Integrity: Trainer's Handbook (April
1980) at Appendix F, p. 275. Relevant portions of the Justice Deparnnent questionnaire are reprinted in the International City
Management Association's useful handbook, The Ethics Factor (May 1988) at 20.

74 Tr. at 227.
75 Tr. at 259-60.

76 Sovern Commission Report at 67.
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easier for decent contractors to do business with the City; they also make it less likely that corruption

will go undetected. "77
Ironically, the red tape with which the City has cloaked the entire contracting process
threatens the very integrity of the system it is designed to protect. As the City's Auditor General
testified at the Commission's October hearings, unless the City commits the resources necessary to
clarify and simplify the City's "byzantine" contracting procedures, it is "doomed to [repetitive] cycles of
corruption, of terrible waste and abuse in government. n7B
The McMullen jail barge contract illustrates some of the hazards inherent in a
contracting system overburdened with red tape. DOI, which reviewed in detail the process by which
McMullen was selected, concluded that the deal itself was not corrupt and that there was no
evidence that any City officials personally benefited from the award. 19 But the steps taken by senior
City officials, even though not in fact corrupt, were consistent in outward appearance with a corrupt
deal. And a deal that looks corrupt can and does undermine the confidence of the public and
competitors in the integrity of the City's contracting process.
The award process for the jail barge consultant contract sends an dangerous message
to the public and to City contracting employees. To the public, and particularly to the business
community, it sends the message that City business is not open to all comers, that only those with an
"inside track" can successfully gain access to lucrative City contracts. To City contracting employees,
it sends the message that comer-cutting is acceptable, that playing fast and loose with the rules and
the facts is permissible. This may not be a case of "corruption" in the literal sense that no City
official personally benefited from it. But the message it sends is deeply corrosive of the integrity of
the contracting process, which depends on the appearance as well as on the reality of fairness and
evenhandedness among vendors.

VII. TI-IE NEW CHARTER PAVES TI-IE WAY FOR REFORM

The new City Charter adopted by the voters on November 7, 1989, requires a radical
reshaping of the contracting process in New York City. The Board of Estimate, which has had final
approval over all contracts awarded by other than competitive sealed bids, has been eliminated.
Procurement is now plainly and unambiguously an executive function, one for which the Mayor is
now clearly accountable.

77 Id. at 91.
1B Tr. at 417, 427.

79 001 Jail Barge Repon at 37.
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The Charter creates a new 5-member Procurement Policy Board, similar to the panel
of experts recommended by both the Sovern Commission and the Institute for Public Administration
in their earlier studies of weaknesses in New York City's contracting system. 80 The Procurement
Policy Board has Citywide authority over both mayoral and non-mayoral agencies (such as the Board
of Education and the Health and Hospitals Corporation) and is charged with establishing a Citywide
set of rules for awarding and administering contracts to which individual agencies must adhere. 81
To address the problems of delay which have plagued the City's contracting system,
the Procurement Policy Board has been given the power to set deadlines which agencies must meet in
awarding contracts and to impose deadlines for payment. 82 Agencies which fail to meet payment
deadlines will, like state agencies, have to pay interest to vendors they have kept waiting.83
Written into the new Charter is an ambitious timetable for drafting and promulgating
the new contracting rules. 84 Members of the Procurement Policy Board are to be appointed by
January 15, 1990. By June 1, 1990, drafts of the proposed rules must be ready for public comment
and debate. The goal is for the new rules to take effect September 1, 1990, the date set for the
demise of the Board of Estimate.

VIII.

'IHE CITY NEEDS AN ACTION PLAN TO MEET
'IHE CHALLENGE POSED BY 1HE NEW CHARTER

Sweeping as the Charter changes are, they amount to only a partial blueprint for
reform. Much remains for the new Mayor, the new City Comptroller and the City Council to do.
A.

The City Must Undertake A Nationwide Search For Procurement Experts
To Serve On The Procurement Policy Board

The broad powers the new Charter gives to the Procurement Policy Board are the key
to contracting reform in New York City. The taxpayers of this City deserve nothing less than the
advice of the most knowledgeable and experienced procurement experts available in this country. To

80 New York City Chaner, §311 (a).
81

New York City Chaner, §311 (b).

82 New York City Chaner, §§311 (b)(6) and 332.

83 New York City Chaner, §332.

84 New York City Chaner, §I 152(d).
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find them, the Mayor and the Comptroller must look conduct a nationwide search for Board members
and staff with a national reputation in the field of procurement.85
At the Commission's October 1989 hearings, the author of the IP A study described
the parochialism of New York City's contracting staff and contracting operations: 86

[F]or an employee organization with over a quaner of a
million employees, [New York City] is ... incredibly
insulated. Reinventing the wheel drove us crazy in our
work . . . They say [they] don't want to recruit somebody
from the outside because [outsiders] don't know how the
City works. [But] if the City isn't working in certain
areas, you have to break that open.
Because so many of the City's contracting personnel are not familiar with advances in
the field of government contracting, the City as a whole has lost the benefit of fresh ideas and new
approaches that have worked well elsewhere. 87 At this critical juncture, the City cannot afford to
continue to tum its back on national developments in public contracting. Each of the five members
appointed to the Procurement Policy Board, as well as senior staff hired to assist the board members,
must have a proven track record in the procurement area.
Adhering to the tight schedule laid out in the Charter for the appointment of the
Procurement Policy Board and for the promulgation of new contracting regulations is essential.
Taxpayers are ill-served by the City's present contracting system and are entitled to expect their
leaders to meet the Charter-imposed deadlines for its replacement. Only by selecting people with
professional experience in the contracting field can the City hope to do so. 88
B.

Procurement Reform Must Be Made A Top Administrative Priority,
Under the Aegis Of A Deputy Mayor For Procurement

The new Mayor needs to appoint a Deputy Mayor whose sole responsibility is the
reform of the City's contracting operations. The City urgently needs one individual who has a bird'seye view of the City's entire $6.5 billion contracting system. Currently, responsibility is so diffuse that

85 The Chaner itself is silent on whether the five members of the Procurement Policy Board are to be full-time salaried
board members or, like directors of a corporation, are to be pan-time advisors.
86 Tr. at 441 (emphasis added).

87 Included in the Appendix is a shon list of organizations which provide resource material and/or training in the field of
government contracting.
88 It took the Mayor's Office of Contracts nearly 18 months to issue its contracting guidelines for RFP contracts. Wimesses
at the Commission's October 1989 hearings testified that contracting guidelines could be rapidly prepared if the task is made
a high priority and assigned to personnel "with real procurement experience." Tr. at 57-58, 236-37, 241-42.
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coordinated reform is virtually impossible.
testimony: 89

As the New York City Auditor General remarked in her

[l]t's as though we were building a bridge and instead of
giving someone responsibility for the entire bridge, it's "you
put this rivet in," "you go inspect the rivet" and by the time
all of that is done, the bridge has never gotten built,
because everybody was so focused on the one rivet.
New York City urgently needs a comprehensive, top-to-toe re-examination of its
contracting operations. The City can no longer afford to tinker with pieces of the system,
implementing changes and im[K>Sing new requirements without carefully analyzing how they effect the
system as whole. The City needs to ·take stock of the personnel -- at every level, from buyers to
deputy commissioners, in every agency -- presently responsible for the City's contracting operations
and consider whether they have the background, training and support necessary to get the job done.
The City needs to examine thoroughly the extent of competition for each segment of
City business and carefully consider how to attract more bidders and expand the pool of vendors
willing to do business with the City. The City also needs to re-visit each and every clause in its
contract documents, standardize and simplify its contract language, review its insurance and bid
security requirements, accelerate the contract registration process and take a hard look at the various
computerized contract data bases which are being developed throughout the City, often in isolation
from one another, to make sure that they are capable of generating the kinds of information
necessary to manage the contracting process effectively.
C.

Every Agency Must Appoint A Chief Contracting Officer

The new Mayor must heed the IP A's warning that every agency with contracting
responsibilities needs a senior level chief contracting officer with professional experience in contract
design, vendor selection and contract management. 90 It is unthinkable that any agency Commissioner
would wish to confront the thicket of laws governing municipal behavior without the advice of the
agency's general counsel. It should be equally unthinkable for Commissioners who preside over the
expenditure of millions of dollars in contracts to do so without the advice of a Chief Contracting
Officer who knows how to attract better contractors, increase competition, forecast costs, improve
specifications, negotiate contracts and monitor vendor performance.
The passage of the new Charter makes the appointment of chief contracting officers
all the more important. Within the framework of the uniform contract rules to be laid down by the
Procurement Policy Board, individual agencies will gain increased contracting autonomy. Although

89 Tr. at 430.

90 IPA Report at 7-8, 20.
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the Mayor must certify for each contract awarded by means other than competitive sealed bids that

all procedural requirements have been met in awarding the contract,91 the Mayor may delegate that
certification function to the agencies, provided he has adequate assurance that the agency is adhering
to the Procurement Policy Board's rules. 92
The way to insure that agencies adhere to those rules is not for the Mayor's office to
police every single contract. The City can no longer afford to diffuse accountability among layers of
checkpoints and controls. Rather, the Mayor must see to it that every agency has in place staff with
sufficient knowledge and training to understand and implement the new contracting rules.
The key to making sure that agency contracting staff have the necessary background
and training is for each agency to appoint a Chief Contracting Officer, equipped with the specialized
skills and experience necesary to make sure that the City gets the most for its contract dollars. He or
she would have primary responsibility for all aspects of the agency's contracting functions and could
be held accountable if mistakes occur.93 Beside advising the Commissioner on specific contract
actions and developing internal guidelines and information systems consistent with new Citywide
regulations, a key responsibility of the Chief Contracting Officer would be the development of training
programs and career paths for agency contracting personnel.
Although Mayor Koch publicly endorsed the IP A study and its recommendations at a
press conference in late 1987, no directive was ever issued requiring each agency Commissioner to
appoint a single high-level contracting professional to oversee the agency's contracting operations.
On the contrary, some agency contracting personnel have complained that their requests for funds to
create and staff an agency-wide chief contracting officer position have been turned down by the
Mayor's Office of Management and Budget.
Instead, the contracting function remains, in most agencies, an organizational
stepchild. Lawyers from an agency's legal staff or personnel from an agency's budget office have been
called upon to shoulder contract responsibilities. A recent set of guidelines issued by the Mayor's
Office of Contracts allows agencies to choose to appoint either one chief contracting officer with
agency-wide responsibility or several chief contracting officers, each responsible for one or more
divisions or bureaus within the agency. 94 While there is certainly a need for experienced contracting
professionals at the division and bureau levels, they are no substitute for a senior contracting person
at the highest level in each agency to serve as the Commissioner's right hand on contract matters.
The present arrangement, by fragmenting responsibility for agency contracting operations, virtually

91 New York City Chaner §327(a) .

93 For a detailed description of the role of the Chief Contracting Officer,~ IPA Repon at 7-8, 60.

94 See Mayor's Office of Contracts, Guidelines for Mayoral Agency Contracting, Pan I, Chapter I, p.1.
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guarantees that contracting problems will not receive the high-level attention and management
resources they deserve.
For the City to persist in ignoring the IPA's recommendation is "penny wise and
pound
Dr. Annmarie Walsh, the author of the IPA study, testified at the Commission's
hearings that the appointment of a Chief Contracting Officer in each agency • · coupled, among other
things, with upgrading the experience and training of City contracting staff and improving the City's
data collection · · would save the City a minimum of $60 million dollars in the first year alone. 96
These are savings which the City simply cannot afford to pass up.
foolish."95

D.

The City Must Overcome Its Acute Shortage
Of Skilled Contracting Personnel

The City must devote serious attention and resources to training its contracting staff.
Over and over again, witnesses at our October 1989 hearings testified that there is an urgent need to
upgrade the skills of City contracting personnel who, compared with their peers in other major cities,
lack exposure to modem government contracting practices.97 Although professionalism "is the key to
both improving the quality of [the City's contracting] performance and minimizing opportunities for
corruption," the IP A found that the City suffers from a "crisis-level shortage of technically skilled
contracting officers" and that "professionalization in contract management is inadequate at all levels in
City govemment."98
Training is especially critical for contracting personnel, scattered throughout the City,
who purchase hundreds of millions of dollars worth of services. Services are often harder to buy than
goods99 and the employees who are responsible for buying them are even less likely to have received
any professional training than the City's employees who buy commodities, equipment and supplies.
Indeed, the lack of competition for City business can be partly attributed to the
inexperience of some City contracting staff, who are often ill-equipped to attract new vendors to the

95 Tr. at 425 .

96 Tr. at 425-27.
97 Tr. at 50-51, 237-40, 423-24, 441, 446, 454. See also IPA Report at 5 ("many of [the City's contracting] problems stern
from a serious shortage in City government of staff and managers with broad and deep experience and expertise in the technical
and managerial aspects of contracting") .
98 IPA Report at 6, 37, 60 (emphasis added) .
99 Tr. at 240.
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City. For instance, to supplement public advertisements in the City Record, 100 agency contracting
personnel often fall back on the simple expedient of mailing bid invitations to anyone listed in the
Yellow Pages or other directory under a relevant heading, without regard for their business experience
or qualifications. Even this limited outreach often amounts to too little too late. 101 The Department
of Correction, in one instance, began combing contractor directories for elevator repair firms shortly
before vendors' bids were due, even though the agency had known for over six months that there was
a need to expand the pool of potential vendors in order to replace a vendor with whose performance
the agency was dissatisfied. It was hardly surprising that the solicitation effort netted just two bidders
-- and that the low bidder was the very firm the agency was seeking to replace.
The City's bid solicitation efforts are often seriously misdirected. In a study of
responses from 2,031 vendors who declined invitations to bid on 720 sealed bid contracts awarded by
HRA between September 1987 and June 1989, the Commission found that nearly half of the vendors
either received the City's bid materials too late to submit a bid or were not even in the business of
providing the desired service. 102 For instance, bid documents for elevator maintenance contracts were
mailed to an artesian well company; "Island-Wide Photo" was sent bid documents for a contract to
repair window sashes; one ironworks company, three asphalt paving companies, one hydrographic
survey company, one water main and sewer company and six construction companies were invited to
submit bids on a contract to install canvas awnings. 103
The problem is not restricted to HRA. When only one vendor responded to DMS'
invitation to bid on a contract to supply nearly two thousand refrigerators to the City for use in
renovated apanments, the Comptroller found that many of the vendors invited to bid sold
"refrigeration systems," a different commodity altogether from the ordinary appliances DMS was

lOO The City Record is a little known City publication in which, by law, publicly let contracts must be advertised. It is
so poorly organized that it is often difficult for busin~ to identify contract opportunities in which they might be interested.

Bid opportunities are not listed in the Q!Y Record alphabetically by type of commodity or service sought • •
}?urglar alarm installation, £Onstruction, f!ata processing and so on • • but by the name of the agency advertising
for bidders. The effect is the same as if "Job Wanted" ads were organized by the name of the employer, instead of by the type
of situation available: the prospective vendor must comb through the entire publication to find what he or she is interested in.

~uctioneering,

To improve the way the City solicits bids, the new Charter, §325(b), gives the Procurement Policy Board the power
to revise the City Record's current format.
lOl The Police Department is one of the few agencies which has developed a computerized system that "tickles the file"
several months before an existing contract is due to expire, so that buyers can get a head start on soliciting bids for the new
contract.

!02 See Commission Exhibit 7 and Tr. at 117. To say, as HRA's Executive Deputy Administrator said at the Commission's
October 1989 hearings, that "you want to give every type of firm an opportunity to bid," Tr. at 174, is no substitute for the sort
of careful market analysis which is necessary to insure that invitations to bid on City contracts generate a meaningful degree
of competition for City business.
103 Tr. at 118-19.
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looking to buy. 104 As of August 1988, OMS' mailing list for bids for frozen waffles and pizza included
a vendor who had been debarred the previous year, at the Department of General Services' initiative,
from doing business with the City for a period of three years. 105
In large part, the City is out of touch with the entire professional field of government
procurement, an area of professional competence complete with professional examination and
certification procedures, a professional oath and a code of professional ethics. At present, there is no
requirement that the hundreds of employees who spend billions of taxpayers' dollars on services,
supplies, equipment or construction be professionally certified as proficient in buying skills. 106
Just as the City's Law Department does not entrust the litigation of millions of dollars
worth of claims against the City to la.wyers who have not been to law school or who have not passed
the bar examination, the City cannot afford to allow billions of dollars to be spent by contracting
personnel who lack the training and professional credentials which are commonplace in other
jurisdictions. 107 The City must give serious thought to creating a career path for the City's
contracting staff, with salaries competitive with the private sector and meaningful professional
certification requirements imposed as a prerequisite for initial hire and advancement.

104 See Commis.sion Exhibit 10.
105 Department of General Services, Division of Municipal Supplies, bid number 1128 l. See In the Matter oflamac Frozen
Food Corp., New York City Board of Responsibility (August 10, 1987).
Although the vendor was subsequentJy removed from the agency's bid list, it took the agency over a year from the date
of the debarment decision to do so.
l06 This is in stark contrast to the U.S. General Services Administration, the federal purchasing agency, which explicitJy
spells out that one way to meet the minimum qualifications for a position in contracting is to have attained certification either
as a Certified Professional Contracts Manager from the National Contract Management Association, as a Certified Purchasing
Manager from the National Association of Purchasing Management, or as a Certified Public Purchasing Officer from the National
Institute of Governmental Purchasing. See Commission Exhibit 23 .

The General Services Administration's Training Center offers over 30 courses in procurement management, all of which
are open to New York City employees. These courses, many of which are taught right here in New York City, range from "Basic
Procurement" to "Contracting for Services," "Negotiation Styles" and "Advanced Cost and Price Analysis." Yet not one of the
24 New York City agencies asked by the Commis.sion to describe their training programs mentioned ever having taken advantage
of these training resources. See U.S. General Services Administration Training Center, lnteragency Catalog and Schedule (Fiscal
Year 1990).
l07 Although the Comrnis.sion heard testimony that professional training is especially important for those buying services
(since it is even harder to buy services than goods), Tr. at 240, these are the very people who are the least likely to seek
professional training or certification.
Membership records maintained by METNY, the local chapter of the National Institute of Governmental Purchasing,
indicate that as of 1989, only eleven City employees had attained professional certification in procurement. Eight of those eleven
employees work at OMS.
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E.

The City Must Shift Its Focus From Policing Paperwork
To Effective Post-Audit

Instead of hiring experienced contracting personnel and training its existing
contracting staff to make sure that contracting decisions are made in accordance with clear, welldefined procedures, the City relies on an extensive oversight network to police contracts and contract
documents before the contract award is finalized. As described above, every RFP contract is reviewed
twice by the Mayor's Office of Contracts. 108 Likewise, if only one bid is received, contracts for
equipment and supplies put out to bid by OMS are sent to the Comptroller's office for review before
the award is finalized. According to the Mayor's Private Sector Survey, multiple reviews and
approvals by City oversight agencies add as much as a year and a half to City construction
projects. 109
The City needs to substantially reduce the "administrative micro-management burden"
the oversight process imposes on the City's contracting operations. 110 The answer, of course, is not
to abandon controls, but to move from a system of pre-audit -- where every transaction is policed
before it is finalized -- to a system of post-audit, a spot-check system designed to make sure that
contracts have been awarded in accordance with the City's rules and procedures. Indeed, if clear
rules are in place and accountability is clearly established, the threat of this kind of post-award review
is considered a "much more cost-effective deterrent to corrupt practice than a cursory pre-review of
every contract." 111
Clear contracting guidelines of the sort the Procurement Policy Board is responsible
for drafting are the sine qua non of an effective post-audit system. They are the standards against
which the performance of City contracting staff can be measured. As the City's Auditor General
explained at the Commission's October hearings: 11 2

There should be consistent standards for everybody in the
City of New York, and every agency will have [them] ..
And then you have the possibility of doing the postauditing you're talking about, so you can remove a lot of
the internal procedures, because you now have something
you can audit for compliance against.

!08 Ironically, this is true even though the Office of Contracts recently completed a comprehensive set of guidelines for
RFPs. See Mayor's Office of Contracts, Guidelines for Mayoral Agency Contracting, Pan II.

I09 Private Sector Survey at 35. See also id . at 20 ("excessive oversight controls, such as multiple reviews of a range of
transactions ... impose endless and costly delays.")
llO Id. at 36.
ll t IPA Repon at 36.

112 Tr. at 431.
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In addition to making sure that the City's contracting guidelines are adhered to, an
effective post-audit function should be designed to determine whether the City got value for the
contract dollars it spent or whether the City "was buying cheap but paying dear." According to
contracting staff interviewed by the Commission, there is an urgent need for the City to look back
and ask itself: "Did we pay more than we should?" "Did we get our money's worth?" Such questions
need to be incorporated into the City's post-audit function on a routine basis.

IX.

CONCLUSION

Almost a decade ago, the U.S. Justice Department warned that: 113

[a] lack of management control can, all by itself, provide
opportunities for corruption. In addition, it can magnify
existing opportunities and minimize the risks that attend
them. Paradoxically, too much control can have the same
effect as too little.
New York City's contracting operations suffer from both too little and too much
control: too many layers of review and control, too few rules which are clear, streamlined and
accessible to everyone. It is widely recognized outside New York City that "good management is ...
the foremost antidote to corruption in govemment." 114 Yet New York does not so much manage its
contracting operations as police them, through a system of checkpoints and controls which threaten
to strangle competition, efficiency and employee morale.
Good management of the City's contracting does not require the City to launch into
uncharted territory. The road to reform is clearly mapped out. There is widespread agreement on
what constitutes good government procurement practices, how to implement them, and what savings
will result. But reform requires a political commitment which, to date, has not been made.

113 U.S. Depamnent of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Maintaining Municipal Integrity. Trainers Handbook (April
1980) at 127 (emphasis added).
114 !Q. at 107.

30

There is no longer time for half measures. The new City Charter creates an
unprecedented opportunity to reform the City's outmcxled and inefficient contracting system and, at
the same time, to safeguard that system from corruption. The City's taxpayers deserve nothing less.

Dated: New York, New York
December 1989

STATE OF NEW YORK
COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY

John D. Feerick
Chairman
Richard D. Emery
Patricia M. Hynes
James L. Magavem
Bernard S. Meyer
Bishop Emerson J. Moore
Cyrus R. Vance
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Appendix

GOVERNMENT CON1RACTING RESOURCE LIST

The following agencies and organizations provide information, resource materials
and/or training in public contracting:

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION TRAINING CENTER (GSA)
The United States General Services Administration's Procurement Management Training
Institute offers over 30 training courses in purchasing and procurement. Their courses are open to
City employees and other local government employees and are often given in New York City.
There are entry-level courses teaching basic procurement and ethics in procurement.
Intermediate and specialized classes cover topics such as construction contracting, evaluating a
contractor's performance, contracting for services, and negotiating techniques. For experienced
personnel, offerings include advanced cost and price analysis and advanced procurement management.
To obtain a course catalogue or for further information, call the GSA at: (703) 557-0986.
For placement on their mailing list, write:
United States General Services Administration
(9KS)
525 Market Street
San Francisco, California 94105

INTERNATIONAL CITI MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION (ICMA)
The professional association of administrators serving cities, counties and local government.
Members receive access to the MIS Inquiry Service, a library of 11,000 reference documents, including
a variety of procurement-related materials such as sample procurement documents for public works
projects and a variety of goods and services.
Phone:

(202) 626-4600

Address:

International City Management Association
1120 G Street
Washington, D.C. 20005
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PURCHASING MANAGEMENT (NAPM)
A national organization with over 160 affiliated as.50Ciations across the county for people
with primary responsibility for purchasing or materials management. Programs and activities include
classes, professional purchasing manager certification, library service and conferences.
For information call: 1-800-888-6276 (toll free) or (602) 752-6276.
Address:

National Association of Purchasing Management
P.O. Box 22160
Tempe, Arizona 85285-2160

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL PURCHASING (N1GP)
A not-for-profit educational and technical organization of government contracting personnel.
NIGP offers a range of services including seminars, professional certification, technical assistance. The
NIGP library contains more than 20,000 specifications, publications and reports.
For information call: (703) 533-7300 or FAX (703) 732-0915
Address:

Nita March
Membership Manager
National Institute of Governmental Purchasing
115 Hillwocxi Avenue, Suite 201
Falls Church, Virginia 22046

ME1ROPOLITAN NEW YORK CHAPTER OF NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
GOVERNMENT PURCHASING (ME1NY)
New York City area NIGP chapter. METNY offers training and hosts speakers on a variety
of procurement-related topics.

Phone:

(718) 271-7323

Address:

Carla Lallatin, Executive Director
METNY
61-15 97th Street, Suite 7A
Rego Park, New York 11373
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PURCHASING MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK (PMA)
PMA is the New York affiliate of the National Association of Purchasing Management
(NAPM) . PMA seeks to foster the development of essential skills and knowledge in the field of
purchasing and materials managment.
Phone:

(718) 739-4900

Address:

Abate Kassa
Executive Director
Purchasing Management Association of New York
161-01 84 Road
Jamaica Hills, New York 11432
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